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In 14 member states of the European Union, women’s relative to men’s levels of job 
satisfaction are compared by using data of the European Household Community Panel. 
The countries under consideration can be assigned to three different groups. Denmark, 
Finland and the Netherlands do not show significant gender-job satisfaction 
differences. In contrast, in Portugal men are more satisfied with their jobs than 
women. However, in the vast majority of the investigated countries female workers 
show a significantly higher level of job satisfaction. As the majority of women are 
disadvantaged compared to men in the labor market, the findings clearly demonstrate 
a gender-job satisfaction paradox in these countries. From this point of view, only 
Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands display gender-job satisfaction equality.  
The results suggest that objective (socio-economic and institutional) determinants of 
labor market statuses and subjective (assessed and evaluated) perspectives are 
mutually complementary. The more restrictive the labor market access and process is 
for women, the more likely a gender-job satisfaction paradox is to emerge in any 
country. With regard to the process of labor market modernization, the results support 
the hypotheses that equal opportunities for women and men like in Scandinavian 
countries and also partially in the Netherlands implicate that the gender-job 
satisfaction paradox does not appear anymore due to a fading-out process over past 
decades.  
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Job satisfaction plays a key role for the subjective well-being and is a crucial factor for 
labor market outcomes. “Greater employee well-being is associated with better job 
performance, lower absenteeism, and reduced job turnover, and is therefore of 
particular interest to firms and other organizations” (Frey and Stutzer 2002: 29). In 
addition to the focus on the pecuniary perspective, the aspect of job satisfaction 
contains potentials for an important variable to analyze the “inequality in the overall 
returns to work” (Hamermesh 2001: 1). Furthermore, job satisfaction is relevant for 
the economic performance, albeit “(e)conomic performance is not intrinsically 
interesting. (...) The relevance of economic performance is that it may be a means to 
an end. That end is not the consumption of beefburgers, nor the accumulation of 
television sets, nor the vanquishing of some high level of interest rates, but rather the 
enrichment of mankind’s feeling of well-being” (Oswald 1997: 1815). Conclusively, 
“(t)he consideration of objective and subjective indicators is nowadays the prevailing 
research strategy” (Noll 2002: 51). For instance, job satisfaction is also relevant to 
social policy, which is never limited to exclusively material matters. Even a pecuniary 
redistribution is likely to have an impact on immaterial aspects like the stability of 
relationships between parents (Walker and Zhu 2005). Hence, social policy requires 
subjective indicators (Veenhoven 2002). Overall, job satisfaction is an important 
indicator for the economy and society as a whole. In the following, not job satisfaction 
as such, but gender differences in job satisfaction across member states of the 
European Union (the EU15, except Sweden
1) is the focus of attention. The objective is 
to test whether gender differences in job satisfaction are assignable to variations in 









Job Satisfaction Positions, the Gender-Job Satisfaction Paradox  
and Labor Market Modernization 
Job satisfaction positions can be presented in a fourfold matrix. The conditions of the 
workplace (‘good’ and ‘bad’) represent objective employment conditions. However, 
these conditions also strongly depend on the institutional background of the national 
and/or regional labor market regime like the social security system, taxation or the 
child day care infrastructure which influences labor supply opportunities (Dingeldey 
2001). These aspects do have an important impact on labor supply prospects, both for 
women and men, as they affect incentives and the possibility to supply labor and the 
quantity supplied (Fahey and Smyth 2004). As “(h)appiness does not only lie within the 
realm of the individual person (…), the fundamental constitutional arrangements, as 
well as specific institutions, crucially affect how happy people are” (Frey and Stutzer 
2002: 175). In a second stage, job satisfaction is of subjective nature, since individuals 
assess their objective conditions subjectively, for instance by means of comparison-
groups (Staw 1986, Clark and Oswald 1996). Hence, job satisfaction-positions depend 
on a combination of objective employment conditions and a (subjectively assessed) job 
satisfaction level (table 1). Within such a framework, originally developed by Zapf for 
welfare positions, a fourfold job satisfaction matrix describes, for instance, ‘Adaption’ 
as a combination of bad objective employment conditions and a good subjective job 
satisfaction. In this case, job satisfaction is a result of leveling (table 1).   
 
Referring to reference level effects, the so-called expectation hypothesis assumes that 
there is a job satisfaction premium in terms of overall job satisfaction for those who 
expect relatively little from their job. The expectations can, for example, concern the 








rationalized as a “function of the perceived relationship between what one wants from 
one’s job and what one perceives it as offering or entailing” (Locke 1969: 316). 
 
Table 1: Job satisfaction matrix
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subjective job satisfaction  Objective 



















a Following Zapf (1984, p. 25). 
 
Within this nexus, the alleged universally valid gender-job satisfaction paradox 
suggests that women possess a higher level of overall job satisfaction as compared to 
men despite an obvious disadvantaged position of women in the labor market, because 
the satisfaction gap of what is expected and what is actually reached is comparatively 
small for women. Accordingly, the more or less pronounced disadvantage in the labor 
market, e.g. in terms of earnings or promotion prospects (EUROSTAT 2002), forces 
women to reduce their job expectations. Therefore, “(w)omen’s higher job satisfaction 








perhaps because their jobs have been so much worse in the past, they have lower 
expectations” (Clark 1997: 365). 
 
So far, the gender-job satisfaction paradox, i.e. the expectation hypothesis, was 
confirmed for the UK (Clark 1996; 1997, Sloane and Williams 2000), whereas little has 
been done so far to test this hypothesis on a cross-national basis. An exception is the 
analysis of Sousa-Poza and Sousa-Poza, who remark that a higher overall job 
satisfaction for women especially occurs in liberal welfare states. Nevertheless, the 
authors do “have no ready explanation as to why it applies primarily to Great Britain 
and the United States” (Sousa-Poza and Sousa-Poza 2000: 150).  
 
However, Clark (1997) and Sousa-Poza/Sousa-Poza (2003) state that this apparent 
paradox is only a transitory phenomenon, as it has to be expected that gender-job 
satisfaction differences are diminishing as soon as employment opportunities for 
women and men are converging. Therefore, the (non-)existence of the gender-job 
satisfaction paradox can be utilized as a proxy for the level of gender-modernization of 
a labor market regime in terms of equal conditions and equal opportunities. Thus, job 
satisfaction-positions also reflect the institutional background.  
 
With the selection of 14 European countries, an important aspect of cross-national 
research is taken into account, namely variation within a common basis of the analysis, 
namely Europe (cf. Scheuch 1990). Within this common frame, the countries can be 
assigned to different welfare state concepts and to different labor market regimes
2: 
Denmark and Finland to a social-democratic, the Netherlands to a conservative/social-








Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain to a residual and the UK and Ireland to a liberal 
regime. Conclusively, welfare-state regimes entail different labor market regimes with 
adequate structures and institutions. 
 
Nonetheless, labor market regimes are non-static, as changes over time can be 
observed in many ways, for instance in terms of female labor supply which increased 
substantially over the past decades in the European Union. A shift in the female’s 
bargaining power within marriage associated with a rise in the opportunity costs of 
raising children, has encouraged women to increase their supply of labor and combine 
a specialization in domestic work with market work, mainly by part-time employment 
(Ott 1992; 1995). However, cross-national differences in the institutional background 
are likely to affect the EU-wide rise of female economic activity, i.e. either they 
promote or they complicate the labor market integration of women. In macro terms, 
the micro-based development of changing employment patterns can be explained by 
the ‘modernization-approach’. One of the leading contemporary commentators on 
modernization distinguishes between ‘initial’, ‘catching-up’, and ‘advanced’ 
modernization, with the latter describing the most recent stage (Zapf 1991a; 1991b; 
1996). A main feature of advanced modernization, as emphasized by Zapf (2001: 501), 
is a ‘new gender contract’ that gives consideration to the rising labor market 
orientation of women. Thus, a cross-national comparison may use different levels of 
modernization to scale the current structure of welfare and labor market regimes in 









By means of the following hypotheses, the (non-)existence of the gender-job 
satisfaction paradox can be interpreted as a proxy for the level of gender 
modernization in a labor market regime: 
•  If no significant gender-job expectation gap is observed, it can be assumed 
that labor market conditions and labor market opportunities of women and 
men tend to be equal (‘Well-Being’, see table 1 above).  
•  A gender-job satisfaction paradox, apparently to the disadvantage for men, 
suggests that women hold a disadvantaged position in the labor market 
(‘Adaptive’).  
•  An obvious gender job-satisfaction gap to the disadvantage of women occurs 
if their job satisfaction level is significantly lower than the job satisfaction of 
men (‘Deprived’).  
 
What kind of job satisfaction-positions have to be expected if the respective 
institutional background that can be regarded as the objective employment condition, 
is taken into account? For Denmark and Finland, it can be assumed that no significant 
gender effect would appear, as Danish and Finnish labor market institutions, i.e. the 
social security system, the tax-system and the child day care infrastructure, tend to 
promote female labor supply, both in quantitative (employment and activity rate) and 
in qualitative terms (employment and job status). For the remaining countries, the 
emergence of a gender-job satisfaction paradox is likely, as their institutional 
backgrounds cannot be rated as modernized compared to Scandinavian institutions: 
“In the Nordic countries, the social democratic principles that guide policy design are 
generally paired with a commitment to gender equality, and the market-replicating 








ideas about family and gender roles. In the liberal countries, the supremacy of the 
market system generally drives social welfare designs across all policy arenas” (Gornick 
and Meyers 2003: 51). This is true, for instance, with regard to child day care 
infrastructure. In contrast to the Scandinavian countries, the supply of child day care 
facilities is low in most countries although demand is high (Gornick et al. 1997; 1998).  
 
The Data 
The European Community Household Panel (ECHP) is a longitudinal EU-15 data set for 
the years 1994 to 2001. The data are processed by EUROSTAT while the field studies 
are carried out by the respective EU-member states.
3 The questionnaire of the ECHP 
contains questions regarding overall job satisfaction and questions that are related to 
specific aspects of job satisfaction, using a scale of 6 degrees, ranging from ‘1’ (not 
satisfied at all) to ‘6’ (fully satisfied). The full data set is used for the investigation of 
job satisfaction-positions with the analysis focusing on ‘overall job satisfaction’ and on 
two specific aspects of job satisfaction: ‘job security’ and ‘number of working hours’. 
Three job satisfaction categories are taken into account as it may be difficult to 
interpret the results of the broad category ‘overall job satisfaction’ without the 
reference points of more concrete job satisfaction categories. Due to the ‘main activity 
concept’ of the ECHP, a questionnaire filter assigns levels of self-reported job 
satisfaction only to employment of at least 15 working hours per week. Hence, job 
satisfaction in small part-time or occasiona l  j o b s  c a n n o t  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  u s i n g  E C H P  
data. The following analyses, however, initially investigate some features of 
employment that are due to objective employment conditions (employment rates, 
employment status, and job status) to sort out general differences in men’s and 








women are considered. To guarantee compatibility between the initial description and 
the analyses with regard to gender-job satisfaction differences, the former is also 
limited to the working population with at least 15 working hours per week. 
 
Employment Rates, Employment Status and Job Status 
The employment rate is a suitable indicator for the quantity of labor supplied. 
Moreover, beside the employment rate, the activity rate is a figure that additionally 
accounts for unemployment. With the exception of men in Luxembourg, both average 
employment and activity rates are highest for men and women in Denmark during the 
years 1994-2001 (see table 2). Additionally, activity rates are highest for Danish and 
Finnish women. However, if comparing differences between countries, the (relative) 
distance regarding labor supply opportunities between men and women should be 
considered. From this point of view, Finland leads with the smallest (relative) distance 
between male and female labor supply. Denmark is second, the UK third, Portugal 
fourth, followed by Austria and France. The highest discrepancies are observed in the 
three Mediterranean countries Spain, Italy and Greece. 
 
Table 2: Employment rates in % of total employable population, 1994-2001 
  FI  DK  UK  PT  AU  FR  DE  BE  NL  LX  IE  IT  GR  SP  EU 
male  69.6  82.5  79.9  78.3  79.6  68.3  76.3  71.7  79.1  83.3  71.6  68.3  73.9  66.3  74.0 
a)  77.4  86.9  82.5  81.7  82.0  74.6  81.2  75.1  81.8  83.7  80.1  76.9  79.2  77.2  79.6 
female  63.5  70.8  64.5  60.7  59.8  50.5  56.3  50.2  53.9  53.4  44.1  38.6  39.7  34.3  50.7 
a)  71.7  75.9  65.9  64.5  62.8  58.5  61.8  54.7  58.0  53.8  49.0  48.5  47.4  47.4  57.1 
Notes: 
aActivity rates. Ascending ranking according to female-male relative difference in the employment 
rate, except EU-average. (AU: 1995-2001, FI: 1996-2001). Population 16-65 years of age, working time ≥ 
15 hours per week. Source: ECHP 1994-2001 (for GE: GSOEP-ECHP, for LU: PSELL-ECHP, for UK: BHPS-









The employment status, however, here defined as standard employment, non-standard 
employment
4 or self-employment, are distributed quite differently among the working 
population. With respect to the (relative) difference in standard employment, the four 
Mediterranean countries, Finland, Denmark and Ireland occupy the first seven ranks of 
this comparison. Due to the comparatively high proportion of part-time employment 
amongst female workers, the remaining seven countries incorporate a high (relative) 
distance regarding the share of standard employment. The largest difference occurs in 
the Netherlands (see table 3).  
 
Table 3: Employment status in % of total employed population, 1995-2001
a 
  GR  FI  PT  IT  SP  IE  DK  FR  UK  BE  LU  AU  DE  NL  EU 
male 
standard  56.5  79.8  74.7  68.4  74.3  71.7  88.1  83.0  79.8  82.5  89.5  85.7  88.0  87.8  78.2 
non-standard  3.5  3.7  1.4  3.3  2.5  6.6  2.8  3.9  2.9  1.9  1.7  1.6  2.0  5.0  3.0 
self-employm.  39.9  16.5  23.9  28.3  23.2  21.7  9.2  13.2  17.2  15.6  8.8  12.7  10.0  7.2  18.8 
female 
standard  66.6  82.2  74.8  65.3  70.4  66.2  79.0  74.4  64.7  66.7  71.4  68.2  70.0  54.2  69.3 
non-standard  13.1  8.9  6.9  18.5  13.5  28.1  16.4  19.2  28.1  23.2  23.1  21.3  23.5  40.8  20.1 
self-employm.  20.3  8.9  18.3  16.2  16.2  5.7  4.6  6.4  7.1  10.1  5.5  10.4  6.6  5.0  10.6 
Notes: 
aStandard (full-time & permanent contract), non-standard (full-time or part-time temporary contract or 
part-time permanent contract). Ascending ranking according to female-male relative difference with respect to 
proportion of standard employment, except EU-average (FI: 1996-2001). Population 16-65 years of age 
working time ≥ 15 hours per week. Source: ECHP (for GE: GSOEP-ECHP, for LU: PSELL-ECHP, for UK: BHPS-
ECHP). Author’s own calculations.  
 
Concerning the job status (see table 4), i.e. a supervisory, intermediate or non-
supervisory job position, Ireland and the UK head the considered EU states with the 
smallest (relative) difference in the share of supervisory jobs. At the very end of that 
ranking, Germany appears with a more than threefold higher proportion of male 









Table 4: Job status in % of total employed population, 1994-2001
a  
 
  IR  UK  FR  SP  AU  DE  FI  GR  BE  LU  PO  NE  IT  GE  EU 
male 
supervisory  15.4  13.1  17.1  10.1  13.4  20.8  20.1  8.3  16.7  14.3  6.8  16.2  11.5  15.4  13.5 
intermediate  15.6  13.5  23.8  19.5  28.8  13.6  16.4  9.1  24.1  26.9  7.3  18.8  17.3  25.8  17.9 
non-superv.  69.0  73.5  59.2  70.4  57.8  65.7  63.5  82.6  59.2  58.9  85.9  65.1  71.2  58.8  68.5 
female 
supervisory  8,1  6,3  7,3  4,3  5,5  8,5  8,0  3,3  6,4  5,2  2,4  5,6  3,9  4,6  5,5 
intermediate  15,5  11,7  17,7  13,8  18,2  14,1  17,1  5,1  15,7  16,3  6,3  12,4  13,0  14,5  13,4 
non-superv.  76,4  82,0  75,0  81,9  76,3  77,4  75,0  91,6  77,9  78,5  91,3  82,0  83,1  81,0  81,1 
Notes: 
a(AU: 1995-2001, FI: 1996-2001, GE & UK: 1994-1996). Ascending ranking according to female-
male relative difference with respect to proportion of supervisory job status, except EU-average. 
Employees below 65 years of age, working time at least 15 hours per week. Source: ECHP (for LU: PSELL-
ECHP). Author’s own calculations.  
 
However, due to the highest share of supervisory jobs both among male and female 
workers, Denmark and Finland are positioned in the middle of this ranking. Overall, the 
discrepancies in the job status are enormous between men and women as well as 
between countries. For example, more than every fifth Danish male worker has a 
supervisory job status, whereas nearly 9 in 10 Portuguese male workers are placed in 
a non-supervisory job position. More than 20% of all Danish or Finnish female workers 
are at least employed in an intermediate position, while more than 90% of Portuguese 
women have a non-supervisory job status. 
 
Especially the results of tables 2 and 3 but also of table 4 show that Denmark and 
Finland clearly display superior outcomes for the labor market position of women 
compared to their female counterparts in the other countries and compared to the 
relative position of women and men in the respective countries. German women, for 
example, hold a comparatively disadvantaged position. The situation in Portugal can be 








remarkably high share of self-employment. However, the employment rate, 
participation rate and the share of standard employment workers is comparatively high 
among women in Portugal, although their job status is far off the level of the other 
countries.  
 
Gender-Job Satisfaction Discrepancies 
Especially for an investigation in differences of self-reported job satisfaction, an 
implementation of unobserved individual fixed-effects within an ordered probit 
regression model would enhance the validity of the outcomes (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and 
Frijters 2005). Nevertheless, this rationale is only suitable for time-variant exogenous 
variables. As gender-differences in levels of job satisfaction are the main focus of this 
paper, a fixed-effect approach cannot be applied. Therefore, an ordinary ordered-
probit regression model is employed to test for the (non-)emergence of a gender-job 
satisfaction paradox. This is the standard model that suits to an ordinal scale level of 
the endogenous variable (Zavoina and McKelvey 1975; Long 1997: 115-147; Greene 
2002: cp. 9). The outcome of such a regression model is based on coefficients, rather 
than on marginal effects, so the interpretation of ordered-probit coefficients mainly 
account for the sign. 
 
Table A-1 reports the set of exogenous variables of the job satisfaction regressions 
that refer to a range of job- and individual characteristics which, according to the 
literature, are likely to influence workers’ levels of job satisfaction (Clark 1996; Clark et 
al. 2001; Judge and Watanabe 1993). The exogenous variables are employment 
status, number of working hours, occupational background, institutional background, 








age of children, marital status, education, unemployment history, respondent’s age 
and state of health. Last, but not least, especially in the case of self-reported (job) 
satisfaction, it is likely that a change in the habit of responding occurs due to social 
desirability when individuals are interviewed repeatedly in a panel survey. Therefore, 
the consecutive numbers of interviews is included as an additional control. To test for 
the hypothesis that job satisfaction diversities between male and female workers within 
a supervisory job status tend to diminish, an interaction term of ‘female’ and 
‘supervisory job position’ (‘supervisory_f’) is introduced into the regression.
5 
 
For 10 out of 14 countries, the expectation hypothesis cannot be rejected, as women 
display higher overall job satisfaction than men, pointing to the existence of a gender-
job satisfaction paradox (table 5). Hence, women possess an ‘adaptive job satisfaction 
position’ in these countries. In Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands, no significant 
gender job satisfaction differences are found, pointing to gender-job satisfaction 
equality in these three countries. Only in Portugal, a negative gender effect regarding 
overall job satisfaction emerges. This suggests a ‘deprived’ position of women in the 
Portuguese labor market. In 9 countries, women with a supervisory job position do not 
differ significantly in their job satisfaction as compared to their respective male 
counterparts. This finding supports the hypothesis of the irrelevance of gender-job 
satisfaction diversities within a higher job status level segment. An additional 
interesting finding is the general negative impact of temporary jobs on job satisfaction, 
which is detected in 12 out of 14 countries. A similar straightforward negative 
correlation is valid for age, although the negative trend diminishes with rising years of 
age since the results for the exogenous variable ‘age squared’ are slightly positive in 








Table 5: Women’s satisfaction with their jobs (relative to men) 
 
Aspect AU  BE  DE  FI  FR  GE  GR IR IT LU NE PO SP UK 
Overall  ÇÇ  ÇÇ  / /  ÇÇÇ ÇÇÇ ÇÇÇ ÇÇÇ ÇÇ  ÇÇ  /  ÈÈÈ  ÇÇ  ÇÇÇ
Job security  /  Ç  /  ÈÈ  ÇÇÇ / /  ÇÇ  ÇÇÇ ÇÇÇ ÇÇÇ  È  -  ÇÇÇ
Working hrs  ÈÈ  ÈÈ  ÈÈÈ  /  È  / /  ÇÇÇ / /  ÈÈÈ  ÈÈÈ  ÈÈ  / 
Notes:  Results from ordered probit regressions using three indicators of job satisfaction as dependent 
variables. Arrows indicate the significance of a dummy variable for women. ÏÏÏ/ÐÐÐ = p < 0.01, 
ÏÏ/ÐÐ = p < 0.05, Ï/Ð = p< 0.10, / = not significant. Additional controls include employment status, 
occupational background, institutional background (public vs. private), job status (supervisory vs. non-
supervisory), job adequacy (self-estimation of skills), number of jobs, income, household context, child-
day care context (number and age of children), relationship context, human capital, unemployment 
history, life cycle context (age), state of health and panel effects (number of interview), (see table A-1). 
Robust standard errors (Huber-White estimator). Population < 65 years of age, working time ≥ 15 hours 
per week. Source: ECHP (for LU: PSELL-ECHP, for UK: BHPS-ECHP, pooled  across  years: 1995-2001, 
except FI: 1996-2001, GE: 1995-1996). Author’s own  calculations (see tables A-2 – A-4). 
 
Turning to the other aspects of job satisfaction, in the countries where significant 
results occur, women display a higher satisfaction regarding job security than men 
(except for Finland and Portugal), but a lower satisfaction regarding the number of 
working hours (except Ireland). This is also true for Denmark and the Netherlands. 
Hence, although we find job satisfaction equality with regard to overall job satisfaction, 
the number of working hours is more sub-optimal for women as compared to men. 
Nevertheless, the concrete direction of the latter finding cannot be sorted out directly 
by means of the ECHP data. It has to be assumed that the full-time regime (part-time 
regime) in Denmark (the Netherlands) may cause dissatisfaction with long working 
hours (short working hours, i.e. part-time) for female employees, respectively.  
 
The findings are only partially in line with former research results. For example, the 








because their analysis was based on a somewhat simpler measure of job satisfaction.
6 
However, the outcomes of table 5 can be explained by the results of the earlier 
analysis of men’s and women’s labor supply (see tables 2 to 4). In those countries with 
a comparatively conservative institutional background like Germany, women’s 
employment opportunities are restricted by the relatively tight ‘conservative’ frame of 
the corporatist welfare regime that forces women to lower their expectations and to 
expect less than men concerning employment opportunities. This results in a German 
gender job-satisfaction paradox. The same is true for the UK and Ireland. Obviously, 
also a liberal setting of the labor market and the welfare state regime is no guarantee 
for equal opportunities for men and women on the labor market. Yet this finding still 
does not serve as a conclusive evidence as to why this may be typical of liberal Anglo-
Saxon regimes. On the contrary, the emergence of the gender-job satisfaction paradox 
in Ireland and the UK is just one example of a higher job satisfaction level for women 
due to their comparatively low expectations that are generated within the frame of a 
liberal labor market setting. But this kind of gender-job satisfaction paradox does not 
necessarily occur in liberal labor market and welfare regimes only. A conservative 
setting, like in Germany, induces a job satisfaction surplus for women, too. 
In Denmark and Finland, the rejection of the expectation hypothesis is due to relatively 
equal employment opportunities for women and men that are valid for full-time 
positions, too. The same is true in the Netherlands, but the labor regime for women is 
mainly part-time. However, the match of Danish and Dutch female workers seems to 
be sub-optimal, as their satisfaction with the number of working hours is below the 
satisfaction of male workers. 
In contrast, the obvious Portuguese gender-job satisfaction gap to the disadvantage of 








South-European country. The relatively high employment rate of women in Portugal 
and the relative high proportion of women working full-time have to be explained in 
the light of the poor Portuguese wage level (ILO 1997). As there is no effective public 
support of employment opportunities for women and mothers, Portuguese women 
tend to have a level of overall job satisfaction that is even below that expressed by 
their male counterparts.  
 
Conclusions 
To investigate how far job satisfaction differences between men and women can be 
rated as a measure for the state of a gender-related labor market modernization, 
fourteen EU countries were analyzed. Overall, three different levels of modernization 
can be identified.  
Denmark, Finland and (partially) the Netherlands at the top with an equal opportunity 
regime that has to be assessed as ‘advanced’ modernization. The Danish and Finnish 
welfare state and labor market regime are deliberately designed to encourage equal 
employment opportunities for men and women by appropriate child day care and tax 
and social security systems. Hence, female labor supply opportunities also include the 
access to full-time jobs to a comparatively high extent, and a flexible allocation of labor 
within private households in terms of labor supply opportunities is feasible. With regard 
to the extensive part-time regime in the Netherlands, advanced modernization is valid 
in this country too, albeit female labor supply opportunities and flexibility are mainly 
restricted to part-time opportunities, which entail specific wage and career penalties 
for female workers (Giovanni and Hassink 2005; Prowse 2005).  
Secondly, concerning the hypothesis that a job satisfaction surplus for women is of 








satisfaction paradox emerges, satisfaction differences will be reduced with an ongoing 
introduction of institutional devices that promote labor market related equal 
opportunities for men and women. Therefore, these 10 countries can be assigned to a 
second level of advanced modernization that incorporates an ongoing gender-related 
labor market modernization which is below the modernization level of Denmark, 
Finland or the Netherlands.  
Thirdly, as Portugal still shows some features of a ‘catching-up’ modernization, the 
Portuguese case cannot unequivocally be assessed as ‘advanced’ modernization. 
Hence, Portugal cannot really be compared with the other countries. However, in the 
absence of institutional devices that foster equal opportunities for men and women, 
the somewhat surprisingly high labor market participation of Portuguese women can 
mainly be explained by the comparatively low wage level that obliges households to 
obtain a second, preferably full-time, income. This nexus is presumably correlated with 
a job satisfaction gap to the disadvantage of women in this country. Thus, for cross-
national research, information cannot only be attributed to a specific welfare state 
policy or labor market regime. Additionally, general economic characteristics, for 
example the wage level, are indispensable to evaluate differences. 
All in all, objective employment conditions and individual estimation of the job 
satisfaction level are mutually interdependent. The more restrictive the labor market 
access is for women, the more likely a gender-job satisfaction paradox is to emerge in 
that country. Finally, these findings also suggest that there is no universal ‘female’ 
attitude towards employment that arises intrinsically or even biologically. On the 
contrary, female labor market participation and gender-job satisfaction differences are 








and labor market regimes and their inherent respective institutions and to differences 
in economic characteristics.  
 
In the context of a joint European strategy that is being considered to cope with the 
expected shortage of skilled labor resulting from demographic trends, the increasing 
educational attainment and rising labor market participation of women offer a unique 
opportunity to integrate women into European labor markets on a sustainable basis 
and implement their social rights in practice, that have been codified legally for 
decades. As ‘the extension of social rights has always been regarded as the essence of 
social policy’ (Esping-Andersen 1990: 3), this rationale should be highly relevant for the 











1. Sweden cannot be considered since the Swedish ECHP data do not contain information with 
regard to job satisfaction. 
2.  For a recent cross-national conceptualisation, see Goodin et al. (1999). For Portugal, see Santos 
(1991). 
3.  An overview of the ECHP is given by Mejer and Wirtz (2002). 
4.  Frequently, no common definition or terminology for changing patterns of employment is 
offered by the literature. For instance, both the negative label ‘marginal’ and the positive label 
‘flexible’ have emerged to describe new forms of employment, when a dividing line is drawn 
between what is said to be ‘ordinary’ or ‘standard’ (namely, permanent full-time waged 
employment) and ‘atypical’. A normative interpretation is often assumed, in which the standard 
pattern is approved and ‘atypical’ work is judged to be inferior. There are obvious problems 
with normative preconceptions of this nature (Dekker and Kaiser 2000). A cross-gender 
comparison using the terms ‘normal/atypical’ cannot be applied consistently because part-time 
employment, for example, would be rather atypical for men but much more common for 
women. Hence, the terms ‘standard’ and ‘non-standard’ employment lead to a more 
comprehensive view, as female employment patterns have changed even more dramatically 
o v e r  t h e  p a s t  d e c a d e s  t h a n  t h o s e  o f  m e n .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  i n  a  c r o s s - n a t i o n a l  c o m p a r i s o n  
equivalent or at least similar types of employment might be more typical in one country and 
less typical in another.   
5.  For the sake of a better overview, tables with prefix ‘A’ are placed to the annex of this paper. 
6. Sousa-Poza and Sousa-Poza (2000) use the cross-sectional data of the International Social 
Survey Programme (ISSP) and employ a binary probit model, distinguishing between low and 
high job satisfaction only. Therefore, their approach does not exploit the entire variation of job 
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Table A-1: Description of exogenous variables, ordered-probit model
a 
Variable     Description  assignment 
female     sex  gender-job satisfaction paradox 
temp     fixed term job 
lnhpw     log working hours per week  employment status 
selfemp     self-employed 
manager     legislators, senior officials and managers 
profession     professionals 
technician   (technicians  and associate professionals) 
clerk     clerks 
service     service workers, shop and market sales 
workers 
occupational background 
agricult     skilled agricultural and fishery workers 
craft     craft and related trades workers 
plant     plant and machine operators and assemblers 
elementw     elementary occupations 
privsector   (private  sector) 
pubsector     public sector 
institutional background 
supervisory_f     supervisory job status, women 
(supervisory_m     supervisory job status, men) 
intermedian     Intermediate 
job status* 
n_supervisory     non-supervisory 
inequivjob    (inadequat job in terms of skills) 
equivjob     adequat job in terms of skills 
job adequacy 
second     second job  multiple job holder effect 
grossincph     gross income per hour  income effects 
singlehhd     single household 
lownparent     single parent household 
kidshhd     (couple with kids)  household context 
nokidshhd     couple, no kids 
elsehhd     other household 
sumkid0-2     number of children 3 - 6 years of age 
sumkid3-6     number of children 3 - 6 years of age  child-day care context 
sumkid7-15     number of children 7 – 15 years of age 
nevmarr     never married 
marri_wido    (married or widowed)  Relationship context 
divor_sep     divorced or seperated  
yrsed     years of education  human capital 
st_up5     short-term unemployment in past five years 
lt_up5     long-term unemployment past five years 
unemployment history 
age     age 
age
2     age squared 
life cycle context 
sick     self-reported bad or very bad health status  state of health 
# interview     number of interview  panel effects 
          Notes: 
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          Table A-2: Job satisfaction regressions (ordered probit model: overall satisfaction) 
 AUS  BEL  DEN  FIN  FRA  GER  GRE 
female 0.070  0.085  -0.012  0.028 0.070 0.135 0.077 
 (2.33)**  (2.48)**  (0.39)  (0.96) (2.96)***  (3.72)***  (2.90)*** 
temp -0.195  0.041  -0.062  0.104 -0.067  -0.114  -0.541 
 (5.23)***  (1.03)  (1.79)*  (3.13)*** (2.24)**  (2.75)*** (19.82)*** 
lnhpw -0.126  0.044 0.005 0.094 0.066 0.045 0.532 
 (2.72)***  (0.80)  (0.10)  (2.23)** (1.91)*  (0.80)  (14.08)*** 
selfemp -0.165  0.027  0.159  -0.000 0.002  0.203  -0.230 
 (2.58)***  (0.39)  (2.15)**  (0.00) (0.04) (2.88)***  (4.55)*** 
manager 0.108  0.170  0.075  0.044 -0.040  -0.007  0.019 
 (1.98)**  (3.29)***  (1.41)  (0.99) (0.90) (0.11) (0.43) 
profession 0.014  0.085  0.048 0.075 0.105 0.123 0.264 
 (0.25)  (2.51)**  (1.32)  (2.15)** (2.86)***  (2.82)***  (6.63)*** 
clerk -0.087  -0.089  -0.106  -0.068 -0.102 -0.006 0.062 
 (2.40)**  (2.61)***  (2.70)***  (1.60) (3.30)***  (0.14) (1.64) 
service -0.051 -0.042 0.032  -0.004 -0.098 -0.012 -0.090 
 (1.36)  (0.90)  (0.77)  (0.10) (2.82)***  (0.23) (2.18)** 
agricult -0.252  0.071  0.184  -0.445 -0.033 -0.104 -0.493 
 (3.77)***  (0.40)  (1.72)*  (7.44)*** (0.54)  (0.82)  (10.61)*** 
craft -0.150  0.074  -0.021  -0.236 -0.062 -0.110 -0.146 
 (4.02)***  (1.47)  (0.50)  (5.62)*** (1.80)*  (2.58)*** (3.77)*** 
plant -0.303  0.109  -0.040  -0.215 -0.180 -0.119 -0.129 
 (5.98)***  (1.84)*  (0.79)  (4.05)*** (5.04)*** (1.90)*  (2.90)*** 
elementw -0.308  0.007  -0.076  -0.150 -0.228 -0.225 -0.286 
 (6.53)***  (0.14)  (1.59)  (2.63)*** (5.47)*** (3.56)*** (5.77)*** 
pubsector 0.158  0.069  0.029 0.046 0.192 0.114 0.399 
 (5.52)***  (2.33)**  (1.04)  (1.76)* (8.97)***  (3.71)***  (15.08)*** 
supervisory_f 0.052  0.073  0.145 0.069 -0.115 0.058  0.107 
 (0.89)  (1.06)  (2.34)**  (1.35) (2.32)**  (0.71) (2.38)** 
intermedian -0.123  -0.104  -0.123 -0.164 -0.150 -0.156 -0.178 
 (3.43)***  (2.55)**  (3.04)***  (4.01)*** (4.86)*** (3.37)*** (3.15)*** 
n_supervisory -0.194  -0.286  -0.100 -0.275 -0.329 -0.293 -0.253 
 (5.62)***  (7.37)***  (2.97)***  (7.39)*** (11.02)***  (6.71)*** (5.50)*** 
equivjob -0.190  -0.151  -0.144 -0.131 -0.151 -0.167 -0.088 
 (9.83)***  (6.27)***  (5.94)***  (6.38)*** (9.52)*** (6.23)*** (5.01)*** 
second -0.014  0.020  0.165 0.034 0.084 -0.014  0.200 
 (0.32)  (0.35)  (5.11)***  (0.89) (1.51) (0.27) (5.25)*** 
grossincph 0.105  0.086  0.024 0.070 0.123 0.191 0.331 
 (5.78)***  (3.67)***  (0.87)  (3.43)*** (6.39)*** (6.62)*** (19.50)*** 
singlehhd -0.110  -0.111  0.027 0.035 0.024 -0.046 0.017 
 (2.19)**  (1.88)*  (0.65)  (0.82) (0.65) (0.84) (0.30) 
lownparent -0.082  -0.100  -0.056 -0.039 -0.028 0.064  -0.060 
 (1.76)*  (1.49)  (0.94)  (0.69) (0.71) (0.90) (1.38) 
nokidshhd -0.095  -0.025  0.066 0.054 -0.021 0.023  0.054 
 (2.71)***  (0.62)  (1.99)**  (1.77)* (0.83)  (0.64)  (1.65)* 
elsehhd 0.027  0.136  -0.132  0.030 0.038 0.006 -0.037 
 (0.84)  (1.66)*  (2.53)**  (0.48) (0.90) (0.09) (1.37) 
sumkid0-2 -0.057  -0.052  0.017 0.090 -0.030  -0.021  -0.010 
 (2.27)**  (1.87)*  (0.69)  (3.63)*** (1.47)  (0.46)  (0.40) 
sumkid3-6 -0.069  -0.036  0.068 0.053 -0.044 0.018  0.040 
 (2.54)**  (1.44)  (2.57)**  (2.24)** (2.16)** (0.45)  (1.65)* 
sumkid7-15 0.003  -0.026  0.032 -0.008  0.003 0.017 0.005 
 (0.22)  (1.44)  (1.75)*  (0.55) (0.23) (0.76) (0.35) 
nevmarr -0.093  -0.040  -0.126  -0.090 -0.035 -0.012 -0.000 
 (2.58)***  (0.93)  (3.70)***  (2.58)*** (1.29)  (0.25)  (0.01) 
divor_sep -0.043  0.021  -0.095 0.031  -0.032 -0.038 -0.012 
 (0.85)  (0.38)  (2.08)**  (0.64) (0.84) (0.63) (0.18) 
yrsed 0.003 -0.006  0.000 -0.011 -0.003 0.002  0.029 
 (0.91)  (1.36)  (0.13)  (3.92)*** (0.95)  (0.51)  (10.86)*** 
st_up5 -0.014 -0.065 0.005  -0.065 -0.096 -0.133 -0.105 
 (0.40)  (1.50)  (0.18)  (2.07)** (2.90)***  (3.16)***  (3.27)*** 
lt_up5 -0.320 -0.003 -0.038 -0.031 0.008  -0.134 -0.094 
 (3.86)***  (0.05)  (0.79)  (0.70) (0.16) (1.93)*  (2.80)*** 
age -0.036  -0.065  -0.050  -0.017 -0.025 -0.040 -0.007 
 (4.80)***  (5.35)***  (5.48)***  (1.91)* (3.38)***  (3.85)***  (0.91) 
age
2 0.000  0.001  0.001  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (4.05)***  (5.20)***  (5.95)***  (2.21)** (2.35)** (3.95)***  (0.66) 
sick -0.552  -0.646  -0.593  -0.420 -0.570 -0.654 -0.063 
 (7.47)***  (5.74)***  (7.73)***  (5.91)*** (11.83)***  (8.53)*** (0.66) 
# interview  -0.011  -0.008  -0.033 -0.032 -0.013 -0.072 0.005 
 (2.60)***  (1.64)  (7.20)***  (6.77)*** (3.86)*** (3.98)*** (1.37) 
l-likelihood_0 -25297.53  -21072.64  -23691.69 -23535.72 -39326.36 -12930.51 -36684.92 
l-likelihood -24666.10  -20790.25 -23322.47 -23117.04 -38461.71 -12588.35 -33295.17 
Wald chi(37)       674.72       299.25       376.44       519.21       890.58       512.04     3805.43 
Prob > chi
2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R
2 0.0250 0.0134 0.0156 0.0178 0.0220 0.0265 0.0924 
N  19327 14235 18305 17507 29559  8936  23291 
           *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%; robust z statistics in parentheses.   24  
 
         Table A-2 (continued): 
 IR  IT  LU  NE  PO  SP  UK 
female 0.126  0.088  0.191  -0.039 -0.073 0.046  0.190 
 (3.80)***  (2.10)**  (2.37)**  (1.60) (3.36)***  (2.27)**  (7.12)*** 
temp -0.178  -0.274  -0.038  -0.075 -0.265 -0.164 -0.161 
 (5.67)***  (4.11)***  (0.28)  (2.93)*** (11.27)***  (9.12)*** (5.50)*** 
lnhpw 0.093 0.287 -0.093  -0.081 0.367  0.023  -0.199 
 (2.31)**  (4.10)***  (0.73)  (2.38)** (8.83)***  (0.72)  (6.44)*** 
selfemp 0.157  -0.149  0.050  0.134 0.067 0.030   n.a. 
 (3.09)***  (2.42)**  (0.30)  (2.41)** (1.69)*  (0.84)    n.a. 
manager -0.001  -0.090  0.171 0.007 -0.055  0.005 0.072 
 (0.02)  (1.29)  (1.09)  (0.23) (1.21) (0.14) (2.11)** 
profession 0.075  0.069  -0.130 -0.030 0.060 0.118 0.001 
 (1.64)  (1.49)  (1.06)  (1.18) (1.46) (3.72)***  (0.04) 
clerk -0.109  -0.155  -0.241  -0.086 -0.103 -0.121 -0.088 
 (2.33)**  (3.70)***  (2.26)**  (3.22)*** (2.93)*** (3.97)*** (2.77)*** 
service -0.015 -0.153 -0.231 -0.002 -0.110 -0.043 0.068 
 (0.32)  (2.58)***  (1.81)*  (0.06) (3.17)***  (1.46) (1.93)* 
agricult -0.071  0.046  -0.300 0.055  -0.386 -0.265 0.222 
 (1.11)  (0.22)  (1.56)  (0.69) (7.87)***  (5.86)***  (1.91)* 
craft 0.006  -0.228  -0.223  -0.047 -0.293 -0.114 0.051 
 (0.13)  (3.50)***  (1.87)*  (1.39) (8.39)***  (4.02)***  (1.29) 
plant -0.200  -0.273  -0.162  0.092 -0.256  -0.228  -0.147 
 (4.04)***  (4.18)***  (1.18)  (2.22)** (6.55)***  (7.12)***  (3.45)*** 
elementw -0.230  -0.547  -0.431 -0.062 -0.375 -0.344 -0.035 
 (4.33)***  (6.16)***  (3.24)***  (1.46) (10.49)***  (11.18)*** (0.77) 
pubsector 0.046  0.144  0.360 0.057 0.321 0.179 0.005 
 (1.50)  (4.23)***  (4.97)***  (2.73)*** (13.32)***  (8.01)*** (0.22) 
supervisory_f 0.101  -0.089  0.001 0.011 0.085 -0.070 -0.083 
 (1.63)  (1.06)  (0.00)  (0.20) (1.73)*  (1.61) (1.89)* 
intermedian -0.015  -0.169  -0.292 -0.066 0.051  -0.098 -0.126 
 (0.37)  (3.64)***  (2.66)***  (2.21)** (1.22)  (3.09)***  (3.66)*** 
n_supervisory 0.010  -0.356  -0.391 -0.118 -0.025 -0.189 -0.156 
 (0.27)  (7.63)***  (3.66)***  (4.15)*** (0.89)  (6.40)*** (4.67)*** 
equivjob -0.268  -0.114  -0.241  -0.106 -0.090 -0.146   n.a. 
 (12.78)***  (4.12)***  (3.99)***  (6.65)*** (5.71)*** (10.77)***   n.a. 
second -0.128  0.179  -0.016  -0.069 -0.007 -0.011 -0.011 
 (2.93)***  (1.77)*  (0.11)  (1.98)** (0.16)  (0.27)  (0.40) 
grossincph 0.124  0.407  0.133 0.039 0.189 0.168 -0.013 
 (6.16)***  (6.43)***  (2.00)**  (2.32)** (13.39)***  (13.53)*** (0.55) 
singlehhd -0.025  -0.041  0.080 -0.100  -0.008  0.027 -0.063 
 (0.38)  (0.52)  (0.65)  (2.82)*** (0.13)  (0.64)  (1.62) 
lownparent -0.035  -0.124  -0.024 -0.114 0.033  -0.044 -0.079 
 (0.65)  (1.47)  (0.16)  (2.09)** (0.89)  (1.39)  (1.94)* 
nokidshhd 0.060  0.032  -0.149 0.028  0.117  -0.004 -0.056 
 (1.47)  (0.55)  (1.70)*  (1.14) (4.22)***  (0.17) (2.20)** 
elsehhd -0.100  0.023  0.172  -0.025 -0.001 -0.007 -0.064 
 (2.59)***  (0.37)  (1.88)*  (0.46) (0.05) (0.33) (1.95)* 
sumkid0-2 0.008  -0.039  -0.057 -0.010 0.040 0.016 0.008 
 (0.31)  (1.01)  (0.77)  (0.45) (1.82)*  (0.82) (0.34) 
sumkid3-6 0.012  0.027  0.095 -0.047  0.008 0.042 0.052 
 (0.46)  (0.70)  (1.22)  (2.19)** (0.36)  (1.93)*  (2.26)** 
sumkid7-15 -0.016  -0.027  0.014 -0.026  -0.005  0.005 0.060 
 (1.19)  (1.14)  (0.33)  (2.01)** (0.43)  (0.42)  (4.35)*** 
nevmarr 0.047  0.072  0.018  -0.062 -0.070 0.005  -0.094 
 (1.03)  (1.16)  (0.19)  (2.23)** (2.50)** (0.18)  (3.07)*** 
divor_sep -0.014  -0.005  -0.069 -0.060 -0.068 0.014  0.016 
 (0.18)  (0.06)  (0.59)  (1.42) (1.32) (0.29) (0.45) 
yrsed -0.007  0.005 -0.010  -0.018 0.006  -0.005 -0.016 
 (1.68)*  (1.55)  (1.11)  (3.04)*** (2.58)*** (2.30)**  (5.40)*** 
st_up5 -0.160 -0.052 -0.222 0.010  -0.121 -0.045 0.027 
 (4.24)***  (0.65)  (1.44)  (0.29) (3.60)***  (2.00)**  (0.99) 
lt_up5 -0.176 -0.030 -0.369 -0.048 -0.186 -0.098 0.075 
 (3.53)***  (0.38)  (1.73)*  (0.85) (5.05)***  (4.44)***  (1.36) 
age -0.027  -0.066  -0.058  -0.049 -0.004 -0.039 -0.049 
 (3.45)***  (4.20)***  (2.34)**  (6.80)*** (0.73)  (7.29)*** (7.23)*** 
age
2 0.000  0.001  0.001  0.001 -0.000  0.000 0.001 
 (4.21)***  (3.93)***  (2.40)**  (6.66)*** (0.07)  (7.48)*** (7.55)*** 
sick -0.535  -0.304  -0.448  -0.656 -0.309 -0.375 -0.218 
 (4.00)***  (3.48)***  (2.76)***  (10.48)*** (9.07)***  (7.78)***  (6.46)*** 
# interview  -0.010  -0.019  -0.014 -0.028 0.012  -0.014 -0.020 
 (2.16)**  (3.28)***  (0.35)  (8.15)*** (3.67)*** (4.78)*** (5.68)*** 
l-likelihood_0 -24529.21  -13642.60  -2610.66  -39477.84 -46257.28 -48818.21 -44391.43 
l-likelihood -24007.41  -13260.27 -2514.05  -39075.16 -44011.55 -47533.58 -43807.72 
Wald chi(37)       574.31       445.90     149.04       453.43     1858.83     1640.95       566.25 
Prob > chi
2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R
2 0.0213 0.0280 0.0370 0.0102 0.0485 0.0263 0.0131 
N  16664 9345  1920 32093  36152  31074  30022 
           *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%; robust z statistics in parentheses, n.a.=information not available.   25  
 
         Table A-3: Job satisfaction regressions (ordered probit model – satisfaction: job security) 
 AU  BE  DE  FI  FR  GE  GR 
female 0.043  0.066  0.004  -0.058 0.074  -0.042 0.028 
 (1.38)  (1.88)*  (0.13)  (1.99)** (3.11)***  (1.14)  (1.05) 
temp -0.627  -0.719  -1.014  -1.086 -1.322 -0.451 -1.202 
 (16.20)***  (16.23)***  (26.04)*** (32.08)*** (38.38)*** (9.57)***  (42.36)*** 
lnhpw 0.025 -0.012  0.115 0.132 0.101 0.013 0.539 
 (0.53)  (0.23)  (2.02)**  (3.08)*** (2.73)*** (0.23)  (14.40)*** 
selfemp -0.188  -0.307  -0.068 -0.244 -0.208 0.066  -0.549 
 (2.79)***  (4.32)***  (0.82)  (4.45)*** (4.32)*** (0.91)  (9.83)*** 
manager 0.090  0.101  0.084  0.006 -0.166  -0.021  0.063 
 (1.64)  (1.83)*  (1.52)  (0.14) (3.60)***  (0.33) (1.45) 
profession -0.124  -0.005 0.046  0.123  0.031 0.099 0.132 
 (1.97)**  (0.15)  (1.18)  (3.44)*** (0.75)  (2.05)**  (3.20)*** 
clerk 0.058  0.010  -0.088  -0.077 -0.023 0.052  0.109 
 (1.47)  (0.28)  (2.26)**  (1.73)* (0.72)  (1.18)  (2.74)*** 
service 0.081  0.037  -0.125  0.055 -0.133  0.145 0.026 
 (2.11)**  (0.77)  (3.10)***  (1.37) (3.71)***  (2.74)***  (0.65) 
agricult 0.204  0.302  0.034  -0.271 0.317  0.171  -0.120 
 (2.73)***  (1.58)  (0.31)  (4.54)*** (5.43)*** (1.28)  (2.58)*** 
craft -0.074  -0.070  -0.121  -0.131 -0.097 -0.172 -0.208 
 (1.95)*  (1.51)  (2.71)***  (3.14)*** (2.82)*** (4.01)*** (5.32)*** 
plant -0.097  -0.071  -0.135  -0.110 -0.119 -0.127 -0.058 
 (1.92)*  (1.33)  (2.72)***  (2.30)** (3.35)***  (2.13)** (1.29) 
elementw -0.029  -0.127  -0.083 -0.049 -0.123 -0.000 -0.069 
 (0.60)  (2.73)***  (1.73)*  (0.93) (3.12)***  (0.00) (1.47) 
pubsector 0.614  0.174  0.230 0.117 0.877 0.459 0.771 
 (19.80)***  (5.62)***  (8.11)***  (4.38)*** (36.92)***  (14.17)*** (26.43)*** 
supervisory_f 0.179  0.051  0.240 0.241 0.000 0.075 0.142 
 (2.72)***  (0.69)  (3.62)***  (4.65)*** (0.01)  (0.86)  (3.21)*** 
intermedian -0.058  0.008  0.155 0.109 0.010 0.014 0.007 
 (1.58)  (0.17)  (3.63)***  (2.63)*** (0.31)  (0.30)  (0.11) 
n_supervisory -0.176  -0.093  0.029 0.020 -0.065  -0.137 -0.143 
 (4.99)***  (2.21)**  (0.80)  (0.51) (2.16)**  (3.13)***  (2.63)*** 
equivjob -0.076  -0.070  -0.095 0.023  -0.074 -0.051 -0.104 
 (3.84)***  (2.87)***  (3.81)***  (1.12) (4.53)***  (1.89)*  (5.97)*** 
second 0.014  0.127  0.100 0.025 0.101 0.051 0.033 
 (0.30)  (2.38)**  (3.01)***  (0.68) (1.83)*  (0.90) (0.86) 
grossincph 0.077  0.101  0.053 0.114 0.193 0.232 0.258 
 (3.90)***  (4.13)***  (2.03)**  (5.29)*** (9.40)*** (8.50)*** (16.06)*** 
singlehhd -0.070  0.048  0.111 0.084 0.060 0.087 -0.016 
 (1.33)  (0.85)  (2.52)**  (2.05)** (1.64)  (1.57)  (0.29) 
lownparent -0.022  -0.033  0.124 -0.015  -0.041  0.149 -0.046 
 (0.46)  (0.49)  (1.96)**  (0.25) (1.02) (2.04)**  (1.04) 
nokidshhd -0.166  0.067  0.059 0.087 0.038 0.114 0.022 
 (4.49)***  (1.69)*  (1.74)*  (2.88)*** (1.51)  (3.08)*** (0.67) 
elsehhd -0.000  0.096  0.027 0.115 0.101 0.046 -0.060 
 (0.01)  (1.17)  (0.51)  (1.67)* (2.30)**  (0.70)  (2.21)** 
sumkid0-2 -0.069  0.039  -0.000 0.016  0.015 0.079 0.022 
 (2.83)***  (1.42)  (0.02)  (0.60) (0.74) (1.78)*  (0.90) 
sumkid3-6 -0.027  0.024  0.047 0.043 -0.006  0.041 0.080 
 (0.95)  (0.90)  (1.75)*  (1.76)* (0.31)  (1.05)  (3.16)*** 
sumkid7-15 0.008  0.014  0.026 0.044 -0.023  0.008 0.034 
 (0.53)  (0.77)  (1.41)  (2.88)*** (1.85)*  (0.35)  (2.40)** 
nevmarr -0.033  -0.017  -0.106 -0.073 0.039  -0.032 0.002 
 (0.91)  (0.39)  (2.88)***  (2.12)** (1.41)  (0.63)  (0.06) 
divor_sep -0.036  -0.059  -0.187 -0.015 -0.002 -0.103 0.021 
 (0.66)  (1.10)  (4.09)***  (0.32) (0.06) (1.63) (0.34) 
yrsed 0.009 -0.000  0.004 0.006 0.007 -0.006  0.017 
 (2.45)**  (0.06)  (1.27)  (2.07)** (2.31)** (1.61)  (6.43)*** 
st_up5 -0.155 -0.267 -0.159 -0.200 -0.125 -0.204 -0.221 
 (4.74)***  (6.41)***  (5.04)***  (6.62)*** (3.78)*** (5.12)*** (6.97)*** 
lt_up5 -0.304 -0.099 -0.292 -0.313 -0.001 -0.426 -0.211 
 (4.55)***  (1.75)*  (6.32)***  (7.42)*** (0.02)  (6.43)*** (6.40)*** 
age -0.055  -0.087  -0.090  -0.084 -0.057 -0.061 0.008 
 (7.09)***  (7.10)***  (9.75)***  (9.50)*** (7.53)*** (5.92)*** (1.17) 
age
2 0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000 
 (7.49)***  (7.50)***  (9.71)***  (9.14)*** (6.82)*** (6.07)*** (0.78) 
sick -0.365  -0.173  -0.239  -0.156 -0.309 -0.312 0.099 
 (4.86)***  (1.92)*  (2.86)***  (2.34)** (6.52)***  (4.18)***  (0.98) 
# interview  -0.002  0.014  -0.020 0.038  0.021  -0.102 -0.016 
 (0.46)  (2.82)***  (4.45)***  (7.89)*** (6.02)*** (5.78)*** (4.35)*** 
l-likelihood_0 -26603.31  -22777.42  -26982.06 -27979.54 -46394.60 -14726.71 -39755.55 
l-likelihood -25485.76  -22154.11 -25743.42 -26451.13 -42193.29 -14141.07 -34582.28 
Wald chi(37)     1190.94       598.49     1208.88     1926.43     3852.65       847.66     5672.98 
Prob > chi
2  0.0420 0.0274 0.0459 0.0546 0.0906 0.0398 0.1301 
Pseudo R
2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N  19306 14253 18406 17483 29545  8926  23301 
           *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%; robust z statistics in parentheses.   26  
 
         Table A-3 (continued): 
 IR  IT  LU  NE  PO  SP  UK 
female 0.066  0.110  0.260  0.160 -0.038  0.031 0.112 
 (1.99)**  (2.58)***  (3.40)***  (6.46)*** (1.74)*  (1.50)  (4.20)*** 
temp -1.032  -1.056  -0.488  -1.024 -0.825 -1.080 -0.924 
 (30.04)***  (14.53)***  (3.95)*** (36.74)***  (33.02)*** (55.50)*** (27.82)*** 
lnhpw 0.347 0.272 -0.130  0.078 0.389 0.166 -0.041 
 (8.06)***  (3.91)***  (1.04)  (2.28)** (8.71)***  (5.13)***  (1.35) 
selfemp -0.089  -0.299  -0.136  -0.171 -0.051 -0.361   n.a. 
 (1.55)  (4.30)***  (0.84)  (3.21)*** (1.20)  (9.57)***   n.a. 
manager 0.002  -0.105  -0.007 0.015  0.067 0.060 0.038 
 (0.03)  (1.39)  (0.04)  (0.49) (1.34) (1.65)*  (1.07) 
profession 0.037  -0.090  0.215 0.017 -0.080  -0.064  0.022 
 (0.70)  (1.93)*  (1.67)*  (0.65) (1.82)*  (1.94)*  (0.65) 
clerk -0.051  0.045  -0.030  -0.191 -0.050 0.026  -0.049 
 (1.02)  (1.05)  (0.27)  (6.74)*** (1.37)  (0.82)  (1.51) 
service 0.116  0.135  -0.082 -0.029 0.008  0.063  0.127 
 (2.34)**  (1.97)**  (0.69)  (0.93) (0.23) (2.19)**  (3.49)*** 
agricult 0.157  0.380  -0.348  0.023 -0.077  0.059 0.061 
 (2.23)**  (1.92)*  (1.66)*  (0.26) (1.61) (1.32) (0.48) 
craft -0.212  -0.058  -0.091  -0.024 -0.153 -0.118 -0.108 
 (3.95)***  (0.94)  (0.76)  (0.71) (4.31)***  (4.22)***  (2.70)*** 
plant -0.376  -0.033  -0.121  -0.061 -0.132 -0.131 -0.080 
 (7.35)***  (0.52)  (0.94)  (1.51) (3.27)***  (4.25)***  (1.94)* 
elementw -0.247  -0.127  -0.040 -0.066 -0.168 -0.098 -0.001 
 (4.56)***  (1.46)  (0.31)  (1.62) (4.60)***  (3.28)***  (0.02) 
pubsector 0.371  0.583  0.652 0.120 0.352 0.303 0.053 
 (10.95)***  (16.34)***  (8.38)***  (5.44)*** (14.29)***  (12.71)*** (2.11)** 
supervisory_f 0.393  -0.064  -0.041 0.015  0.098 0.081 0.021 
 (5.76)***  (0.69)  (0.24)  (0.28) (1.96)**  (1.93)*  (0.45) 
intermedian 0.371  0.003  -0.137 0.104  0.276  0.141 -0.035 
 (7.65)***  (0.06)  (1.17)  (3.28)*** (6.18)*** (4.12)*** (0.95) 
n_supervisory 0.414  -0.162  -0.248 -0.039 0.070 0.060 -0.119 
 (9.74)***  (3.25)***  (2.19)**  (1.30) (2.32)**  (1.86)*  (3.35)*** 
equivjob -0.186  -0.055  -0.122  -0.032 -0.050 -0.042   n.a. 
 (8.65)***  (1.88)*  (2.03)**  (2.00)** (3.21)***  (3.04)***    n.a. 
second -0.192  0.203  0.278 -0.041  0.077 0.012 0.048 
 (3.71)***  (1.86)*  (1.88)*  (1.17) (1.86)*  (0.27) (1.64) 
grossincph 0.239  0.262  0.269 0.040 0.142 0.149 -0.105 
 (10.63)***  (3.91)***  (4.00)***  (2.32)** (10.09)***  (12.32)*** (4.44)*** 
singlehhd -0.032  0.074  -0.010 -0.028 0.031  0.047  -0.097 
 (0.49)  (0.95)  (0.08)  (0.76) (0.52) (1.14) (2.50)** 
lownparent -0.057  -0.138  -0.032 -0.004 -0.001 0.056  -0.053 
 (1.11)  (1.72)*  (0.22)  (0.07) (0.04) (1.85)*  (1.26) 
nokidshhd 0.033  0.059  -0.108  0.114 0.088 0.054 -0.019 
 (0.80)  (1.00)  (1.26)  (4.72)*** (2.89)*** (2.17)**  (0.74) 
elsehhd -0.005  0.042  0.011 0.031 -0.004  0.063 0.009 
 (0.13)  (0.65)  (0.11)  (0.58) (0.17) (2.92)***  (0.26) 
sumkid0-2 0.006  0.027  0.119 0.083 -0.000  0.016 0.005 
 (0.22)  (0.66)  (1.69)*  (3.85)*** (0.01)  (0.78)  (0.22) 
sumkid3-6 -0.058  0.024  0.083 0.044 -0.009  0.027 0.040 
 (2.14)**  (0.58)  (1.06)  (2.05)** (0.43)  (1.22)  (1.69)* 
sumkid7-15 0.006  -0.009  0.058 0.029 -0.038  -0.002  0.039 
 (0.43)  (0.38)  (1.38)  (2.14)** (3.15)***  (0.14)  (2.79)*** 
nevmarr 0.023  0.108  0.018  -0.042 -0.148 -0.061 -0.045 
 (0.48)  (1.76)*  (0.19)  (1.47) (5.12)***  (2.44)**  (1.47) 
divor_sep 0.037  0.078  -0.056 0.005  -0.053 -0.020 0.013 
 (0.38)  (0.85)  (0.47)  (0.12) (1.05) (0.42) (0.38) 
yrsed -0.001  -0.004  -0.010 -0.021 0.004  -0.002 0.001 
 (0.16)  (1.23)  (1.21)  (3.43)*** (1.66)*  (0.95)  (0.23) 
st_up5 -0.317 -0.117 -0.178 -0.083 -0.222 -0.205 -0.056 
 (8.26)***  (1.56)  (1.27)  (2.57)** (6.48)***  (9.39)***  (2.14)** 
lt_up5 -0.354 -0.258 -0.537 -0.136 -0.222 -0.243 -0.028 
 (7.48)***  (3.70)***  (2.45)**  (2.53)** (6.29)***  (11.06)***  (0.55) 
age -0.047  -0.039  -0.009  -0.095 -0.003 -0.029 -0.078 
 (5.82)***  (2.45)**  (0.40)  (13.06)*** (0.60)  (5.67)***  (11.38)*** 
age
2 0.001  0.000  0.000  0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
 (6.12)***  (2.72)***  (0.75)  (11.88)*** (0.39)  (6.23)***  (10.44)*** 
sick -0.427  -0.020  -0.111  -0.354 -0.123 -0.142 -0.181 
 (3.47)***  (0.22)  (0.62)  (6.10)*** (3.61)*** (3.40)*** (5.64)*** 
# interview  0.036  -0.029  -0.049 0.037  0.020  -0.003 0.016 
 (7.04)***  (5.08)***  (1.16)  (10.24)*** (6.01)***  (1.08)  (4.52)*** 
l-likelihood_0 -25558.35  -14261.78  -2768.45  -47639.38 -49643.18 -52735.54 -47789.59 
l-likelihood -23543.66  -13558.05 -2584.16  -45860.70 -46545.55 -48013.21 -46731.46 
Wald chi(37)      2329.17       806.87     267.17     2061.29     2557.35     5870.85     1181.10 
Prob > chi
2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R
2 0.0788 0.0493 0.0666 0.0373 0.0624 0.0895 0.0221 
N  16566 9347  1920 32017  35871  31115  29855 
           *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%; robust z statistics in parentheses, n.a.=information not available.   27  
 
         Table A-4: Job satisfaction regressions (ordered probit model – satisfaction: number of working hrs) 
 AUS  BEL  DEN  FIN  FRAU  GER  GRE 
female -0.064 -0.067 -0.112 0.019  -0.033 -0.023 0.004 
 (2.09)**  (2.00)**  (3.65)***  (0.67) (1.70)*  (0.66) (0.17) 
temp -0.199  -0.026  -0.205  -0.076 -0.027 -0.078 -0.468 
 (5.36)***  (0.68)  (5.80)***  (2.30)** (0.94)  (1.96)** (17.20)*** 
lnhpw -1.042  -0.934  -1.179  -0.508 -0.390 -1.159 -0.882 
 (20.22)***  (15.72)***  (15.74)*** (9.59)***  (11.75)*** (18.24)*** (20.35)*** 
selfemp -0.239  -0.110  -0.080  -0.241 -0.048 -0.056 -0.507 
 (3.67)***  (1.72)*  (1.17)  (4.20)*** (1.37)  (0.86)  (9.77)*** 
manager -0.043  0.092  -0.149  -0.209 -0.031 -0.152 0.138 
 (0.79)  (1.76)*  (2.92)***  (4.52)*** (0.85)  (2.49)**  (3.17)*** 
profession -0.223  -0.017  -0.110 -0.091 -0.022 -0.005 0.171 
 (3.89)***  (0.50)  (3.19)***  (2.55)** (0.74)  (0.12)  (4.38)*** 
clerk 0.069  0.014  0.032  0.088 0.135 0.038 0.181 
 (1.84)*  (0.40)  (0.78)  (2.12)** (5.36)***  (0.88)  (4.84)*** 
service -0.092 -0.048 -0.109 -0.158 0.020  -0.125 -0.027 
 (2.39)**  (1.03)  (2.51)**  (3.76)*** (0.71)  (2.30)**  (0.68) 
agricult -0.130  0.092  0.132  -0.247 0.247  -0.107 -0.304 
 (1.94)*  (0.50)  (1.23)  (4.36)*** (5.17)*** (1.17)  (6.73)*** 
craft 0.085  0.176  0.113  0.101 0.138 0.042 0.087 
 (2.27)**  (3.68)***  (2.67)***  (2.52)** (5.08)***  (1.01)  (2.26)** 
plant -0.131  0.093  0.112  -0.060 0.061  -0.033 0.020 
 (2.58)***  (1.60)  (2.11)**  (1.21) (2.11)**  (0.57) (0.44) 
elementw -0.116  0.016  0.023 0.006 0.038 -0.165  0.032 
 (2.47)**  (0.33)  (0.47)  (0.11) (1.15) (2.43)**  (0.65) 
pubsector 0.244  0.121  0.118 0.032 0.162 0.137 0.315 
 (8.27)***  (4.13)***  (4.17)***  (1.22) (9.35)***  (4.58)***  (12.07)*** 
supervisory_f 0.120  0.072  0.059 0.087 0.009 0.062 0.054 
 (2.05)**  (1.08)  (0.99)  (1.73)* (0.23)  (0.80)  (1.23) 
intermedian 0.012  0.052  0.073 0.165 0.038 -0.056  -0.202 
 (0.33)  (1.26)  (1.75)*  (3.93)*** (1.35)  (1.29)  (3.38)*** 
n_supervisory 0.037  0.006  0.078 0.140 0.077 -0.040  -0.166 
 (1.08)  (0.16)  (2.29)**  (3.63)*** (2.95)*** (1.01)  (3.43)*** 
equivjob -0.102  -0.056  -0.085 -0.035 -0.047 0.005  -0.051 
 (5.31)***  (2.33)**  (3.50)***  (1.69)* (3.13)***  (0.20)  (3.00)*** 
second 0.043  0.012  0.086  -0.086 -0.207 0.005  0.033 
 (0.95)  (0.22)  (2.46)**  (2.31)** (3.87)***  (0.09)  (0.82) 
grossincph 0.084  0.061  0.037 0.082 0.216 0.159 0.146 
 (4.60)***  (2.71)***  (1.50)  (4.19)*** (12.45)***  (6.24)*** (9.64)*** 
singlehhd -0.094  -0.054  0.094 0.042 -0.166  -0.048  0.019 
 (1.86)*  (0.96)  (2.17)**  (0.96) (5.74)***  (0.92) (0.35) 
lownparent -0.008  -0.050  0.069 -0.007  -0.153  0.085 -0.001 
 (0.16)  (0.76)  (1.20)  (0.13) (4.61)***  (1.17) (0.03) 
nokidshhd -0.053  0.043  0.080 0.031 0.076 0.079 -0.016 
 (1.57)  (1.18)  (2.41)**  (1.06) (3.42)***  (2.25)**  (0.51) 
elsehhd 0.092  0.056  -0.013  0.010 0.160 0.031 -0.038 
 (2.79)***  (0.68)  (0.23)  (0.18) (4.10)***  (0.48) (1.48) 
sumkid0-2 -0.059  -0.016  -0.031 0.014  -0.017 -0.057 -0.034 
 (2.37)**  (0.62)  (1.13)  (0.56) (0.91) (1.34) (1.44) 
sumkid3-6 -0.052  0.005  0.023 0.011 -0.106  0.051 -0.010 
 (1.99)**  (0.20)  (0.85)  (0.45) (5.57)***  (1.31) (0.43) 
sumkid7-15 0.006  -0.013  0.017 0.001 0.001 -0.013  0.002 
 (0.40)  (0.71)  (0.92)  (0.07) (0.08) (0.61) (0.13) 
nevmarr 0.043  0.000  -0.080  -0.044 0.122  0.069  -0.009 
 (1.16)  (0.00)  (2.32)**  (1.26) (5.17)***  (1.40) (0.27) 
divor_sep 0.059  0.061  -0.017  0.048 0.271 0.035 -0.023 
 (1.18)  (1.17)  (0.36)  (0.95) (8.08)***  (0.57) (0.38) 
yrsed -0.008  -0.011  0.001 -0.009 -0.008 -0.001 0.015 
 (2.16)**  (2.74)***  (0.16)  (3.15)*** (3.10)*** (0.29)  (5.81)*** 
st_up5 -0.041 -0.032 0.031  -0.007 -0.053 -0.067 -0.084 
 (1.16)  (0.78)  (1.01)  (0.21) (2.02)**  (1.70)*  (2.62)*** 
lt_up5 -0.199 -0.067 0.008 0.083 0.107 -0.118  -0.047 
 (2.68)***  (1.16)  (0.17)  (1.86)* (2.38)**  (1.92)* (1.43) 
age -0.024  -0.052  -0.046  -0.029 -0.088 -0.025 -0.012 
 (3.14)***  (4.41)***  (5.04)***  (3.34)*** (12.97)***  (2.58)*** (1.74)* 
age
2 0.000  0.001  0.001  0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (3.19)***  (4.57)***  (5.83)***  (3.68)*** (11.09)***  (2.98)*** (1.63) 
sick -0.292  -0.168  -0.254  -0.307 -0.124 -0.238 0.096 
 (4.06)***  (1.70)*  (2.94)***  (5.07)*** (2.81)*** (2.99)*** (1.00) 
# interview  0.002  -0.017  -0.036 -0.023 0.379 -0.015  0.005 
 (0.44)  (3.67)***  (7.86)***  (4.97)*** (98.53)***  (0.83)  (1.32) 
l-likelihood_0 -27705.99  -22143.41  -26662.16 -27589.28 -44635.02 -14170.06 -36839.54 
l-likelihood -26330.06  -21555.31 -25770.32 -26789.03 -37271.55 -13647.79 -33714.83 
Wald chi(37)     1300.80      497.74      687.05       777.27   14187.44       680.05     3569.44 
Prob > chi
2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R
2 0.0497 0.0266 0.0334 0.0290 0.1650 0.0369 0.0848 
N  19300 14233 18425 17502 29574  8919  23301 
           *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%; robust z statistics in parentheses.   28  
 
         Table A-4 (continued): 
 IRE  ITA  LUX  NET  POR  SPA  UK 
female 0.125  -0.029 -0.016 -0.078 -0.078 -0.049 0.023 
 (3.86)***  (0.69)  (0.19)  (3.21)*** (3.57)*** (2.49)**  (0.87) 
temp -0.302  -0.342  0.047  -0.069 -0.122 -0.191 -0.105 
 (9.60)***  (4.63)***  (0.37)  (2.71)*** (5.29)*** (10.71)*** (3.56)*** 
lnhpw -0.626  -0.769  -0.801  -0.786 -0.622 -1.117 -0.847 
 (13.09)***  (10.56)***  (5.05)*** (21.65)***  (11.11)*** (29.15)*** (23.91)*** 
selfemp 0.063  -0.209  -0.120  0.138 -0.006  -0.008    n.a. 
 (1.16)  (3.41)***  (0.75)  (2.75)*** (0.14)  (0.22)    n.a. 
manager -0.150  -0.109  0.073  -0.083 -0.101 -0.079 -0.063 
 (2.90)***  (1.64)  (0.50)  (2.80)*** (1.99)**  (2.13)**  (1.85)* 
profession -0.001  -0.023  0.150  -0.089 -0.122 -0.050 -0.134 
 (0.02)  (0.51)  (1.22)  (3.50)*** (2.82)*** (1.63)  (4.08)*** 
clerk -0.029  0.056  0.127  0.027 -0.011  0.067 -0.016 
 (0.63)  (1.31)  (1.26)  (0.98) (0.29) (2.27)**  (0.52) 
service -0.126 -0.042 -0.124 -0.083 -0.156 -0.086 -0.087 
 (2.68)***  (0.65)  (1.01)  (2.55)** (4.20)***  (2.87)***  (2.56)** 
agricult 0.047  -0.017  -0.162 0.156  -0.271 -0.107 0.169 
 (0.68)  (0.09)  (0.83)  (2.34)** (5.45)***  (2.46)** (1.21) 
craft 0.048  -0.085  -0.045  0.022 -0.102  0.051 -0.030 
 (0.98)  (1.35)  (0.40)  (0.63) (2.87)***  (1.83)*  (0.75) 
plant -0.142  -0.188  -0.133  0.171 -0.199  -0.131  -0.157 
 (2.93)***  (2.87)***  (1.02)  (4.20)*** (4.93)*** (4.06)*** (3.73)*** 
elementw -0.188  -0.292  -0.429 0.032  -0.209 -0.080 -0.057 
 (3.58)***  (3.06)***  (3.07)***  (0.77) (5.76)***  (2.66)***  (1.29) 
pubsector 0.161  0.366  0.264 0.142 0.369 0.409 0.012 
 (5.06)***  (10.68)***  (3.53)***  (6.71)*** (15.28)***  (19.12)*** (0.52) 
supervisory_f 0.062  -0.030  -0.078 0.053  -0.048 0.033  -0.036 
 (1.00)  (0.35)  (0.44)  (1.05) (0.94) (0.77) (0.82) 
intermedian 0.193  0.042  0.047 0.069 0.067 0.085 0.059 
 (4.49)***  (0.86)  (0.45)  (2.25)** (1.45)  (2.55)** (1.66)* 
n_supervisory 0.240  -0.017 0.124  0.110  0.061 0.130 0.046 
 (6.34)***  (0.34)  (1.22)  (3.85)*** (1.93)*  (4.14)*** (1.34) 
equivjob -0.220  -0.078  -0.121  -0.096 -0.051 -0.082   n.a. 
 (10.37)***  (2.81)***  (1.97)**  (6.00)*** (3.22)*** (5.97)***   n.a. 
second -0.023  0.372  0.130  -0.220 -0.079 -0.084 -0.074 
 (0.50)  (3.76)***  (0.87)  (6.17)*** (1.93)*  (1.96)*  (2.64)*** 
grossincph 0.131  0.105  0.059 0.067 0.072 0.148 0.077 
 (6.22)***  (1.68)*  (0.89)  (4.18)*** (4.98)*** (12.07)*** (3.35)*** 
singlehhd -0.015  0.045  0.029  -0.021 0.075  -0.034 -0.015 
 (0.24)  (0.59)  (0.23)  (0.60) (1.28) (0.84) (0.39) 
lownparent 0.046  -0.028  0.077 0.014 0.053 -0.018  -0.085 
 (0.89)  (0.38)  (0.56)  (0.26) (1.42) (0.57) (2.16)** 
nokidshhd 0.053  0.159  -0.088  0.000 0.077 0.057 -0.048 
 (1.24)  (2.86)***  (0.99)  (0.02) (2.70)***  (2.27)**  (1.90)* 
elsehhd -0.021  -0.028  0.227 0.028 0.022 -0.013  -0.015 
 (0.55)  (0.43)  (2.27)**  (0.56) (0.92) (0.62) (0.46) 
sumkid0-2 0.006  0.047  -0.050 -0.020 0.018  0.041  -0.044 
 (0.23)  (1.24)  (0.63)  (0.96) (0.79) (2.06)**  (1.93)* 
sumkid3-6 -0.019  0.069  0.235 -0.035  0.028 0.021 0.022 
 (0.72)  (1.75)*  (3.10)***  (1.71)* (1.27)  (0.98)  (0.94) 
sumkid7-15 0.002  -0.002  0.008  -0.006 -0.026 -0.011 0.003 
 (0.14)  (0.11)  (0.20)  (0.46) (2.07)**  (0.90) (0.24) 
nevmarr 0.100  0.117  -0.021  -0.055 -0.057 0.115  -0.027 
 (2.34)**  (1.92)*  (0.22)  (1.99)** (2.00)** (4.62)***  (0.90) 
divor_sep -0.048  0.068  -0.072 -0.022 -0.080 0.076  0.001 
 (0.54)  (0.78)  (0.55)  (0.53) (1.59) (1.70)*  (0.03) 
yrsed -0.008  -0.004  -0.018  -0.026 -0.001 -0.002 -0.015 
 (1.91)*  (1.22)  (1.90)*  (4.59)*** (0.56)  (1.16)  (5.10)*** 
st_up5 -0.131 0.041  -0.068 -0.012 -0.085 0.022  0.012 
 (3.47)***  (0.55)  (0.46)  (0.36) (2.47)**  (1.00) (0.44) 
lt_up5 -0.123 -0.129 -0.237 -0.036 -0.114 -0.065 0.044 
 (2.50)**  (1.88)*  (0.84)  (0.66) (3.04)***  (2.97)***  (0.89) 
age -0.038  -0.037  -0.044  -0.056 -0.011 -0.007 -0.030 
 (4.82)***  (2.41)**  (1.77)*  (8.00)*** (1.86)*  (1.30)  (4.43)*** 
age
2 0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (4.92)***  (2.45)**  (1.91)*  (7.72)*** (1.22)  (2.30)**  (4.42)*** 
sick -0.345  -0.289  0.214  -0.222 -0.151 -0.195 -0.107 
 (2.54)**  (3.30)***  (1.42)  (3.67)*** (4.26)*** (4.60)*** (3.45)*** 
# interview  0.040  -0.020  0.064  -0.021 0.014  -0.023 -0.015 
 (7.88)***  (3.61)***  (1.68)*  (5.98)*** (4.05)*** (7.83)*** (4.35)*** 
l-likelihood_0 -24914.95  -14495.35  -2756.89  -46562.03 -43059.52 -52555.75 -48683.06 
l-likelihood -23980.67  -13892.68 -2652.51  -45391.26 -41708.86 -49922.95 -47364.14 
Wald chi(37)       923.67       681.86      142.13     1026.36     1102.90     2930.55     1003.64 
Prob > chi
2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R
2 0.0375 0.0416 0.0379 0.0251 0.0314 0.0501 0.0271 
N  16533 9322  1917 32087  35882  31098  30027 
           *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%; robust z statistics in parentheses, n.a.=information not available. 